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Simple vs Optimal Mechanisms in Auctions with Convex Payments
AMY GREENWALD, Brown University
TAKEHIRO OYAKAWA, Brown University
VASILIS SYRGKANIS, Microso Research
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in seings where bidders’ utility functions are non-
linear; specically, convex, with respect to payments (such seings arise, for instance, in procurement auc-
tions for energy). We provide constant factor approximation guarantees formechanisms that are independent
of bidders’ private information (i.e., prior-free), and for mechanisms that rely to an increasing extent on that
information (i.e., detail free). We also describe experiments, which show that for randomly drawn monotone
hazard rate distributions, our mechanisms achieve at least 80% of the optimal revenue, on average. Both our
theoretical and experimental results show that in the convex payment seing, it is desirable to allocate across
multiple bidders, rather than only to bidders with the highest (virtual) value, as in the traditional quasi-linear
utility seing.
1 INTRODUCTION
e trade o between simplicity and optimality in mechanism design has been well-explored over
the past decade. A long line of work has addressed whether simple mechanisms can achieve
approximately optimal performance in single-dimensional environments [Bulow and Klemperer,
1996, Hartline, 2015, Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009, Myerson, 1981, Roughgarden et al., 2016].
Typically, simplicity requirements take the form of prior-freeness: the mechanism should be prior-
free, meaning it should not depend on any distributional knowledge about participants’ private
information; or, it should be detail-free, meaning it should only minimally depend on it. Such
oblivious designs lead to more robust guarantees, as they do not heavily depend on modeling as-
sumptions, or on data collection to learn about the participants’ private information.
All of the aforementioned work on simple, optimal auctions assumes that bidders’ utilities are
quasi-linear with respect to payments, i.e., ui = vixi − pi , where vi > 0 is i’s private value, xi is
his allocation, and pi is his payment to the auctioneer. A notable exception is the work of Fu et al.
[2013], who consider prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents, who are modelled by a
very specic form of capped quasi-linear utilities.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of simple, optimal auction design, assuming utilities
of the form ui = vixi − ci (pi ), where ci (·) is a convex function that characterizes the impact of pi
on i’s utility function, which we can interpret as i’s perceived1 payment, as it is distinct from pi ,
i’s actual payment to the auctioneer. We focus primarily on payments of the form ci (pi ) = pdi , for
some xed exponent d ≥ 2.
Our original motivation for convex payments stemmed from a reverse auction design problem in
the realm of renewable energy markets. Consider a procurement auction in which a government
with a xed budget is oering subsidies (in euros, say) to power companies in exchange for a
supply of renewable energy (in was, say). Suppose the power companies’ utility functions take
this form: ui = xi −ci (pi )/vi , where xi is some fraction of the total budget in euros, and pi is some
1While perceived payments may be hallucinated, for example by risk-averse bidders, perceived payments refer, more
generally, to any payments made to anyone other than the auctioneer.
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deliverable amount of power in was.2 e value vi can be understood as a production rate, in
that the company can produce vi was per euro. e assumption that ci (·) is convex reects the
fact that energy production costs may not be linear; on the contrary, it may be the case that as
more energy is produced, further units become more expensive to produce.
Another problem which also ts into our framework is the problem of allocating a xed block
of advertising time to retailers during the Superbowl. In this application, an advertiser’s utility
is calculated by converting its allocation, in time, into dollars via its private value (measured in
dollars per time unit), and then subtracting the cost of production: ui = vixi − ci (pi ). Here again,
production costs can be convex; for example, the advertiser might have to borrow funds to enable
production, and in so doing, might be subject to a non-linear (and publicly disclosed) interest rate.
In both of these problems, the auctioneer seeks an optimal auction: i.e., one that maximizes its
total expected revenue. Specically, in the energy problem, the government’s objective is to max-
imize the amount of power produced, subject to its budget constraint. In the advertising problem,
the television network is seeking to maximize its revenue for selling a xed block of advertising
time during the Superbowl. ese examples motivate our goal of searching for simple, optimal
auctions, assuming convex payments.
e departure from quasi-linear utilities presents both technical and qualitative dierences. As
a rst, the optimal mechanism does not appear to have such an intuitive, closed-form characteriza-
tion, but rather is the outcome of an ugly convex program (see Section 6.1). Beyond this technical
diculty, the Myerson characterization [Myerson, 1981], in which the optimal auction in a sym-
metric enviornment with regular distributions allocates to bidders with the highest values above
some reserve, is no longer valid. As our next example shows,3 any mechanism that allocates only
to the highest-value bidders cannot achieve a constant factor approximation.
Example 1.1. We show that, if we insist on allocating to only bidders of the highest value, the
resulting mechanism can be very suboptimal, with a suboptimality ratio that decays to zero as the
number of bidders N approaches innity, at a rate of 1/N 1/4. Consider the following distribution
of values: the value of each bidder is either 1 with probability
log(N )√
N
, or 1 − ϵ with probability
1 − log(N )√
N
. As the number of bidders grows large, then with very high probability there will be
approximately
√
N bidders with value 1, and approximately N − √N bidders with value 1 − ϵ . So
the interim allocation of a highest-bidders-win auction is approximately: 1/
√
N for a bidder with
value 1, and 0 for a bidder with value 1 − ϵ . It follows that the payment of a bidder with value
1 is
√
xv =
√
x(1) ≈ 1/N 1/4 (see Section 2.3), while the payment of a bidder with value 1 − ϵ is
approximately 0. us, the expected payment of a single bidder is approximately
(
1√
N
) (
1
N 1/4
)
,
and the total expected revenue is N times this quantity, which is N 1/4.
On the other hand, if we instead allocate to all bidders uniformly at random (as long as they bid
at least 1−ϵ), then we can charge everyone √xv =
√
1
N (1 − ϵ), leading to a total expected revenue
of
√
N (1 − ϵ). As ϵ → 0, the ratio of this laer mechanism to the former is O(N 1/4).
is nding is not specic to this pathological example. Experimentally, for many value distri-
butions, we nd that mechanisms that allocate only to bidders with the highest value, although
they performwell in quasi-linear seings, can perform very poorly in the convex payment seing.
2Multiplying ui byvi yields amore familiar utility function—that of the forward auction seing: viu i = ui = vixi−ci (pi ),
with utility measured in units of power, rather than money.
3We present a rough sketch of the proof here, deferring a detailed exposition to Appendix A.
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Contributions. Despite these technical and qualitative diculties, we show that simple mecha-
nisms, which are prior-free or detail-free, can achieve very good worst-case approximation ratios,
relative to the optimal revenue. We also experiment with these simple mechanisms, as well as
related mechanisms that were not so amenable to analysis, and nd that they perform very close
to optimally for a wide variety of distributions on values.
More concretely, ourmain theoretical results holdwhen payment functions take the formci (pi ) =
pdi , for d ≥ 2, and when the distribution of values satises the Monotone Hazard Rate condition.
For this seing, these results can be summarized as follows:
• We characterize an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal auction by nding a closed-
form solution to a convex program that upper bounds the optimal revenue.
• We show that a mechanism which sets a reserve price by drawing randomly from the
distribution of values, and then allocates uniformly to all bidders above this reserve, is
a constant factor approximation to the optimal mechanism. is result implies a prior-
free, constant factor approximation auction: randomly pick one bidder, and then allocate
uniformly to all bidders who values fall above that of this price-seing bidder.
• If the auctioneer knows the median of the value distribution, then a beer approximation
guarantee can be achieved by seing the reserve to be this median. Further optimization
of the reserve price, tailored to the specic form of the convex payment function, assuming
it is known, leads to even beer approximation ratios.
• Even if the auctioneer does not know the exact form of the payment functions, but as long
as they are of the form pdi , for some d ≥ 2 which is known to the bidders, then a simple
all-pay auction which allocates the good uniformly to the top quarter of the bidders, yields
a constant factor approximation. is auction, while not truthful, is independent of the
distribution of values and of the exponent d in the payment function.
In addition, we experiment with the performance of the aforementioned proposed auctions, as
well as other auctions that look qualitatively similar. In our experiments, we draw from random
distributions of values, and then we compute the revenue of each of auction, as well as the optimal
revenue, for up to 30 bidders. As a necessary step, we also show how one can formulate the optimal
revenue computation as a convex programwith the number of variables equal to the support of the
distribution of values (for nite support distributions). We nd that auctions that are worst-case
constant factor approximations achieve on average at least 80% of optimal, assuming more than 4
bidders, thereby achieving much beer guarantees experimentally than in theory.
Related Work. Vickrey [1961] showed that auctions in which the highest bidder wins and pays
the second-highest bid incentivize bidders to bid truthfully. Myerson [1981] showed that in the
single-parameter seing, with the usual quasi-linear utility function involving linear payments,
total expected revenue is maximized by a Vickrey auction with reserve prices. Our seing is not
captured by Myerson’s classic characterization because perceived payments in our model are not
equivalent to actual payments.
Bulow and Klemperer [1996], Hartline and Roughgarden [2009], and Roughgarden et al. [2016]
study simple prior independent mechanisms. e results in Bulow and Klemperer [1996] show
that running a simple second-price auction is a (n − 1)/n approximation in symmetric seings
with quasi-linear utilities. Hartline and Roughgarden [2009] extend this analysis to obtain similar
results in asymmetric seings. e result of Bulow and Klemperer [1996] can also be phrased as
obtaining a constant factor approximation by running a second-price auction with a reserve drawn
randomly from the distribution of values. Our constant factor prior-independent result stems from
this intuition. However, as we show in the introduction, allocating only to the highest bidders can
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be very suboptimal. Hence, we modify our mechanism to allocate uniformly at random to all
bidders that surpass the reserve. We show that this simple modication is crucial to obtaining
constant factor approximations in the convex payment seing.
e technical diculties that arise in our seing are similar in spirit to the ones faced by
[Pai and Vohra, 2014] when designing optimal auctions for budget-constrained bidders. If ci (pi ) =
pki for some k ≫ 0, then ui = vixi − pki quickly approaches −∞ if pi > (vixi )1/k . us, we can
interpret a utility function with convex perceived payments as a continuous approximation of that
of a budget-limited agent whose utility is −∞ whenever her payment exceeds her budget.
Our model also has strong connections with the literature on optimal auctions for risk-averse
buyers (see [Maskin and Riley, 1984]), since a concave utility function can be interpreted as a form
of risk aversion.
Translating a reverse auction into a direct auction bymultiplying utility by the private parameter
vi was previously proposed in the literature on optimal contests (see, for example, [Chawla et al.,
2012, DiPalantino and Vojnovic, 2009]).
Procuring services subject to a budget constraint is also the subject of the literature on budget-
feasible mechanisms initiated by [Singer, 2014]. However, in this literature, the service of each
seller is xed and the utility of the buyer is a combinatorial function of the set of sellers the buyer
picks. In our seing, each seller can produce a dierent level of service by incurring a dierent
cost, so the buyer picks not only a set of sellers, but a level of service that each seller should provide
as well. is renders the two models incomparable.
Seings where bidders’ utilities decrease at least as quickly as payments increase have been
studied by [Sakurai et al., 2008], in the context of strategy-proof environments.
Our model is also related to the parameterized supply bidding game of [Johari and Tsitsiklis,
2011], where rms play a game inwhich they submit a single-parameter family of supply functions.
ere, a non-truthful mechanism decides how much each rm is asked to produce. Here, we
consider the design of truthful mechanisms and we study a dierent objective, but we also restrict
aention to single-parameter families of supply functions ci (pi ).
Optimal mechanism design with non-linear preferences (mostly budget constraints) has been
analyzed by several papers and we refer the reader to Chapter 8 of [Hartline, 2015] for a recent
survey on the state of the art. For the case of non-linear preferences that we analyze, no closed
form solution of the optimal mechanism is known and thereby deriving intuitive approximations
seems like a good alternative. In principle, some formulations of our problem can be solved us-
ing Border’s characterization of interim feasible outcomes [Border, 1991] and an ellipsoid-style
algorithm with a separation oracle. Even more generally, we can apply the algorithmic approach
of [Cai et al., 2013] for computing the optimal mechanism, which again is based on an ellipsoid-
style algorithm. However, such mechanisms tend to be computationally expensive and do not
yield closed form characterizations of good mechanisms. Here, we seek fast allocation heuristics
with potential economic justication, such as virtual-value-based maximization. Virtual-value-
maximizing approximations to optimal auction design were also studied recently by [Alaei et al.,
2013] in the context of multi-dimensional mechanism design, and from a worst-case point of view.
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
ere is one seller who would like to sell one unit-sized divisible good, and there are n bidders that
would like to buy as much of it as possible. Each bidder i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n} has a private value
for the good in its entirety. Each value vi is drawn independently from an atomless distribution F ,
with continuous probability density f that is strictly positive on the support, which is the closed
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interval T = [0, v¯]. Let v = (v1, . . . ,vn) ∈ Tn be a sample value vector, drawn from distribution
Fn .
Given a vector of reports b = (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Rn , with bi ∈ T , for all i ∈ N , a mechanism
produces an allocation rule x(b) ∈ [0, 1]n together with a payment rule p(b) ∈ R≥0, where bidder
i’s (actual) payment to the seller is pi (b). For vectors such as b , we use the notation b = (bi , b−i )
to emphasize the distinction between bidder i’s role in the auction, and all other bidders N \ {i}.
Let the utility of each bidder i be
ui (bi , b−i ) = vixi (bi , b−i ) − ci (pi (bi , b−i )) , (1)
where ci : R≥0 → R≥0 is a convex payment function. For readability, we oen write ci (bi , b−i )
instead of ci (pi (bi , b−i )). is is bidder i’s perceived payment, beyond his actual payment pi (b),
which only includes payments made to the auctioneer. Similar to the payment rule, we refer to
c(b) ∈ Rn≥0, comprised of variables ci (bi , b−i ), as the perceived payment rule.
2.1 Constraints
Next, we formalize the constraints we impose on an optimal auction design. Because we restrict
our aention to incentive compatible auctions, where it is optimal to bid truthfully, we write, for
example, ci (vi , v−i ) instead of ci (bi , b−i ).
A mechanism is called incentive compatible (IC) if each bidder maximizes her utility by re-
porting truthfully (i.e., bi = vi ): ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ,wi ∈ T , and ∀v−i ∈ T , vixi (vi , v−i ) − ci (vi , v−i ) ≥
vixi (wi , v−i ) − ci (wi , v−i ). Individual rationality (IR) ensures that bidders have non-negative
utilities: ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ T , and ∀v−i ∈ T , vixi (vi , v−i ) − ci (vi , v−i ) ≥ 0.
Next, we dene IC and IR in expectation (with respect to F−i ). We introduce interim allocation
and interim perceived payment variables, respectively: xˆ i (vi ) ≡ xˆi (vi , ·) = Ev−i [xi (vi , v−i )]
and cˆi (vi ) ≡ cˆi (vi , ·) = Ev−i [ci (vi , v−i )]. ese variables comprise the interim allocation and
perceived payment rules, xˆ (v) ∈ [0, 1]n and cˆ(v) ∈ Rn≥0.
We call a mechanism Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if utility is maximized by truthful
reports in expectation: ∀i ∈ N and ∀vi ,wi ∈ T , vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆi (vi ) ≥ vi xˆ i (wi ) − cˆi (wi ). Interim
individual rationality (IIR) insists on non-negative utilities in expectation: ∀i ∈ N and ∀vi ∈ T ,
vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆi (vi ) ≥ 0.
We say amechanism is ex-post feasible (XP) if it never overallocates: ∀v ∈ Tn ,∑ni=1 xi (vi , v−i ) ≤
1. Finally, we require that 0 ≤ xi (vi , v−i ), xˆi (vi ) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ T and ∀v−i ∈ Tn−1.
e goal of the auctioneer is to maximize expected revenue, which is equal to: Ev [
∑
i ∈N pi (v)].
If we denewith pˆi (vi ) = Ev−i [pi (vi , v−i )], then the goal of the auctioneer is to optimize
∑
i ∈N Evi [pˆi (vi )].
2.2 Distributions and Properties
We introduce some useful notation and terminolgy with respect to properties of the distribution
F . For any distribution F , let q(v) = 1 − F (v), be the quantile function, and let v(q) = q−1(·), be
the inverse quantile function. e quantile of a value v is the probability that a random draw from
distribution F exceeds v . Observe that quantiles are distributed uniformly on [0, 1].
In the usual quasi-linear seing, R(q) = v(q)q = v(q)(1 − F (v(q)) is the revenue function,
assuming distribution F . Intuitively, R(q) is the expected revenue of a seller who posts a reserve
price of v(q) (i.e., one that is surpassed with probability q). In the convex payment seing, this
function is the perceived revenue function. Since, F is atomless with support [0, v¯],R(0) = R(1) =
0.
Finally, let q∗ ∈ argmaxq∈[0,1] R(q) be the quantile corresponding to optimal revenue, which we
will refer to themonopoly quantile. Further, let η = v(q∗) be the posted price corresponding to
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the monopoly quantile, which we will refer to as themonopoly reserve. We will also denote by
κ = v(1/2) the median of the distribution, and by µ = Ev∼F [v], the mean.
Wewill be looking at two standard classes of distributions. e smaller class is that of monotone
hazard rate (MHR) distributions, which require that h(v) = f (v)/(1 − F (v)) be monotone non-
decreasing. e larger class is that of regular distributions, which require that R(q) be a concave
function, or equivalently ϕ(q) = R′(q) = v(q) − 1−F (v(q))
f (v(q)) , be monotone decreasing. Since ϕ(q) =
v(q) − 1
h(v(q)) , it is easy to see that an MHR distribution is also regular.
We now state two lemmas describing bounds on revenue curves, depending on the assumptions
made on the distributions values are drawn from.
Lemma 2.1 ([Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015]). For any MHR distribution,
R(q∗) ≥ µ
e
. (2)
Lemma 2.2 ([Samuel-Cahn, 1984]). For any regular distribution, R(q∗) ≤ κ.
Proof.
R(q∗)
2
≤ R
(
1
2
)
= v
(
1
2
)
F
(
1 −v
(
1
2
))
=
κ
2
. (3)

2.3 Allocation, Payments, and Revenue
Myerson showed that for a mechanism to satisfy BIC, IIR and XP, four conditions needed to hold.
Among them, he showed that there is a specic payment formula that must be used. We restate
his result below, adapted to the convex payment seing. For simplicity, we assume u(0) = 0, as
will be the case for all our mechanisms. Although we state this theorem for the BIC/IIR/XP seing,
we note that it is easily extendable to the (robust) IC/IR/XP seing.
Theorem 2.3 ([Myerson, 1981]). Assuming a convex payment function, a mechanism is BIC, IIR
and XP if and only if the following conditions hold:
• e allocation rule is monotone:
xˆ i (vi ) ≥ xˆ i (wi ), ∀i ∈ N ,∀vi ≥ wi ∈ T , (4)
• (Perceived) payments satisfy the following condition:
vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆi (vi ) =
∫ vi
0
xˆ i (zi ) dzi , ∀i ∈ N ,∀vi ∈ T , (5)
Myerson showed that the total expected revenue of such a mechanism can be described using
virtual values. We restate his ndings, adapted to the convex payment seing.
Dene the virtual value function as follows:
φi (vi ) = vi − 1 − Fi (vi )
fi (vi )
= R′(q(vi )). (6)
Theorem 2.4 ([Myerson, 1981]). Assuming a convex payment function, the total expected per-
ceived payment of a BIC, IIR, and XP mechanism is:∑
i ∈N
E
vi∼Fi
[cˆi (vi )] =
∑
i ∈N
E
vi∼Fi
[φi (vi )xˆi (vi )] =
∑
i ∈N
E
vi∼Fi
[R′(q(vi )) · xˆ i (vi )] (7)
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In the traditional quasi-linear seing, when the convex payment function is the identity func-
tion, the fact that virtual surplus is equivalent to revenue tells us that in order tomaximize revenue,
the good should be allocated to among bidders with the highest non-negative virtual values.
However, in the convex payment seing, the actual revenue of the auctioneer is not pinned
down by Myerson’s theorem; only perceived revenue is. at is, Myerson’s characterization only
pins down the expected perceived payment of a bidder, conditional on that bidder’s value, i.e.,
cˆi (vi ) = Ev−i [ci (pi (vi , v−i ))]. But the auctioneer is trying to maximize Ev [
∑
i pi (v)], which does
not have any obvious interpretation using Myerson’s characterization of perceived payments.
Nevertheless, we now prove a lemma that allows us to make such a connection. We show that
for all payment rules pi (v) that might not be independent of v−i , there exists a corresponding
payment rule hi (vi ) that is independent of v−i , and that ensures at least as much revenue.
Consider a (possibly randomized) auction, Auction A, where pAi (vi , v−i , r ) denotes bidder i’s
payment in auction A. (Here, r is the outcome of some randomization device.) We dene another
auction, Auction B, with payment rule pBi (vi , v−i , r ) = hi (vi ) for some functionhi (vi ) that depends
only on vi . More specically, hi (vi ) = c−1i
(
Ev−i ,r
[
ci
(
pAi (vi , v−i , r )
)] )
.
Lemma 2.5. An arbitrary allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n , together with the corresponding payment rule pˆA
or pˆB , satises BIC, BIR, and XP for Auction A if and only if it satises BIC, BIR, and XP for Auction
B. Moreover, Auction B’s total expected revenue is at least that of Auction A’s.
Proof. We begin with the rst part. Observe that the proposed payment rule preserves interim
bidder payments, and hence, utilities. More concretely:
cˆBi (vi ) = E
v−i
[
ci
(
pBi (vi , v−i )
)]
= ci (hi (vi )) = ci
(
c−1i
(
E
v−i,r
[
ci
(
pAi (vi , v−i , r )
)]))
= cˆAi (vi ). (8)
Hence, for all bidders i ∈ N and values vi ,wi ∈ T , vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆBi (vi ) ≥ vi xˆ i (wi ) − cˆBi (wi ) i
vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆAi (vi ) ≥ vi xˆ i (wi ) − cˆAi (wi ) and vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆBi (vi ) ≥ 0 i vi xˆ i (vi ) − cˆAi (vi ) ≥ 0.
Now we prove the second part. Since ci (·) is convex, by Jensen’s inequality,
hi (vi ) = c−1i
(
E
v−i,r
[
ci
(
pAi (vi , v−i , r )
)])
≥ E
v−i ,r
[
c−1i
(
ci
(
pAi (vi , v−i , r )
))]
= E
v−i ,r
[
pAi (vi , v−i , r )
]
.
(9)
In other words, payments in Auction B can only exceed those of Auction A. erefore, the total
expected revenue of Auction B is at least that of Auction A. 
is lemma establishes that in our search for an optimal auction, it suces to restrict our aen-
tion to auctions like Auction B in which payments are (deterministic) function of value alone:
Corollary 2.6. Any revenue maximizing mechanism that is BIC, IIR and XP also satises:
pˆi (vi ) = c−1i (cˆi (vi )) = c−1i
(
vi xˆ i (vi ) −
∫ vi
0
xˆ i (zi ) dzi
)
, ∀i ∈ N ,∀vi ∈ T . (10)
We will see in later sections that Equation 10 leads to an easy calculation of the revenue of the
optimal mechanism. However, this connection still does not lead to a nice characterization of the
optimal mechanism, which is the outcome of a convex optimization problem, and can be arbitrarily
complex. In the next sections, we will propose simple mechanisms that are approximately optimal.
3 UPPER BOUND ON OPTIMAL REVENUE
By individual rationality, we can upper-bound the total expected revenue of a mechanism by∑
i ∈N
E
v∼F
[pi (v)] ≤
∑
i ∈N
E
v∼F
[
c−1i (vixi (v))
]
. (11)
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We call the quantity on the right hand side, pseudo-surplus, and describe how to maximize it in
Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. When, ∀i ∈ N , ci = pdi , where d > 1, the allocations that maximize pseudo-surplus
are given by
xi (vi , v−i ) =
v
1/(d−1)
i∑
j∈N v
1/(d−1)
j
, ∀i ∈ N ,∀v ∈ Tn . (12)
e proof of Lemma 3.1 is a straightforward application of the equi-marginal principle [Gossen,
1854], and we explain it in full in Appendix C.
Using pseudo-surplus and Lemma 3.1, we nowgive an upper bound to the total expected revenue
that can be generated in a BIC/IIR mechanism,OPT , which is described in terms of the number of
bidders, their values and distributions, and d .
Lemma 3.2. When, ∀i ∈ N , ci = pdi , where d ≥ 2:
OPT ≤ n
( µ
n
)1/d
, (13)
where µ = Ev∼F [v].
Proof. Startingwith the optimal solution to pseudo-surplus, given by Lemma3.1, we can upper-
boundOPT as follows:
OPT ≤ E
v

∑
i ∈N
©­«vi ·
v
1/(d−1)
i∑
j v
1/(d−1)
j
ª®¬
1/d  = Ev

∑
i ∈N
v
1/(d−1)
i
1(∑
j v
1/(d−1)
j
)1/d
 = Ev

(∑
i ∈N
v
1/(d−1)
i
) d−1
d  .
Observe that f (x) = x (d−1)/d is a concave function for d > 1, thus E[f (X )] ≤ f (E[X ]). Hence:
OPT ≤
(∑
i ∈N
E
[
v
1/(d−1)
i
] ) d−1d
.
Similarly д(x) = x1/(d−1) is a concave function for any d ≥ 2. Hence:
OPT ≤
(∑
i ∈N
(E[vi ])1/(d−1)
) d−1
d
=
(
nµ1/(d−1)
) d−1
d
= n
( µ
n
)1/d
.

We now upper boundOPT when assuming values are drawn from an MHR distribution.
Theorem 3.3. When, ∀i ∈ N , ci = pdi , where d ≥ 2 and the value distribution F is an MHR
distribution:
OPT ≤ n
(eκ
n
)1/d
. (14)
Proof. Lemma2.1 and Lemma 2.2 tell us that: µ ≤ eR(q∗) ≤ eκ. is, combinedwith Lemma 3.2,
proves the theorem. 
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4 RESERVE PRICE MECHANISMS
We now turn to the design of simple prior-free mechanisms for the convex payment seing. We
begin our analysis by looking at uniform-allocation reserve price mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that
allocate uniformly at random to all bidders whose value vi is above some reserve price r ,
4 or
equivalently, to bidders whose quantile qi is below some quantile reserve qˆ . ese mechanisms
charge each of the bidders who bid at least the reserve c−1i
(
v(qˆ)
Z
)
. is payment rule makes the
mechanism not only BIC, but ex-post IC. We then describe the performance of mechanisms that
select a quantile reserve uniformly at random. Finally, we show how selecting a quantile uniformly
at random can be easily implemented as a prior-free mechanism by simply picking one bidder at
random from the n bidders and using him as a reserve price seer. is leads to the main result
of this section: a constant-factor approximately optimal prior-free mechanism. We conclude this
section by noting that if one is allowed to make minimal use of the distribution, then a reserve
price which is equal to the median of the distribution yields a beer approximation ratio. In the
Appendix, we also show that a reserve price that depends on both the distribution and the exponent
in the payment function can lead to even beer worst-case performance.
Prior-free mechanism. We begin with the analysis of the revenue of a uniform-allocation reserve
price mechanism, with quantile reserve qˆ .
Lemma 4.1. Consider a convex payment seing with ci = p
d
i , ∀i ∈ N , where d ≥ 1. Let APX (qˆ) be
the expected revenue of a mechanism that allocates uniformly across all bidders with quantile qi ≤ qˆ
and charges each of these Z bidders ex-post truthful payments (v(qˆ)/Z )1/d . en:
APX (qˆ) ≥ n
(
v(qˆ)
1 + (n − 1)qˆ
)1/d
qˆ. (15)
Proof. e expected revenue the mechanism with reserve price v(qˆ) is
APX (qˆ) = E
v∼F

n∑
i=1
(
v(qˆ)1vi ≥v(qˆ)∑n
j=1 1vj ≥v(qˆ)
)1/d  .
e probability that vi ≥ v(qˆ) is 1 − F (v(qˆ)) = qˆ, and if there exists a winner, the denominator is
at least one, so
APX (qˆ) = E
v∼F

n∑
i=1
(
v(qˆ)
1 +
∑n−2
j=1 1vj ≥v(qˆ)
)1/d  qˆ =
n∑
i=1
E
v∼F

(
1
1 +
∑n−1
j=1 1vj ≥v(qˆ)
)1/d  v(qˆ)1/d qˆ.
e function h(x) = 1/(1+ x)1/d is convex for d ≥ 1. By Jensen’s inequality, E[h(x)] ≥ h(E[x]), so
we have
E
v∼F

(
1
1 +
∑n−1
j=1 1vj ≥v(qˆ)
)1/d  ≥
(
1
1 + Ev∼F
[∑n−1
j=1 1vj ≥v(qˆ)
] )1/d = ( 1
1 + (n − 1)qˆ
)1/d
,
and
APX ≥
n∑
i=1
(
1
1 + (n − 1)qˆ
)1/d
v(qˆ)1/d qˆ = n
(
v(qˆ)
1 + (n − 1)qˆ
)1/d
qˆ.

4Or, if a good is divisible, uniformly across the total number of winners.
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Given the performance of a mechanism with quantile reserve qˆ, we now describe how well a
mechanism does by selecting the quantile reserve uniformly at random.
Lemma 4.2 (Random Reserve Price Mechanism). Consider a convex payment seing with ci =
pdi , ∀i ∈ N , where d ≥ 1. Let APX be the expected revenue of a mechanism which draws a quantile
reserve qˆ uniformly at random in [0, 1], and then allocates uniformly across all bidders with quantile
qi ≤ qˆ, and charges each of these Z bidders ex-post truthful payments (v(qˆ)/Z )1/d . en:
APX ≥ 1
8
n1−1/dκ1/d . (16)
Proof. A lower bound on the total expected revenue of the mechanism can be computed by
integrating APX (qˆ) with respect to quantile qˆ:
APX =
∫ 1
0
APX (qˆ) dqˆ
Invoking Lemma 4.1, and since qˆ ∈ [0, 1], the quantity APX (qˆ) can be lower-bounded as follows:
APX (qˆ) ≥ n1−1/dv(qˆ)1/d qˆ. (17)
us we get:
APX ≥ n1−1/d
∫ 1
0
v(qˆ)qˆ
v(qˆ)1−1/d dqˆ ≥ n
1−1/d
∫ 1
1/2
R(qˆ)
v(qˆ)1−1/d dqˆ.
Since κ = v(1/2) ≥ v(qˆ) for 1/2 ≤ qˆ ≤ 1, we have
APX ≥ n
1−1/d
κ1−1/d
∫ 1
1/2
R(qˆ) dqˆ, (18)
and because R(qˆ) is concave,
∫ 1
1/2 R(qˆ) dqˆ ≥ 12 12R(1/2) = κ/8, where the last step follows from the
proof of Lemma 2.2, so
APX ≥ 1
8
n1−1/dκ1/d . (19)

We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section: a constant factor prior-free mecha-
nism. Observe that to draw a random quantile reserve, we do not need to know the distribution of
values, as the quantile of a randomly selected bidder is equivalent to a randomly drawn quantile
reserve. at is, we can sacrice a randomly selected bidder by using his quantile as the reserve
and run a random reserve price mechanism among the n − 1 bidders. Notice that this mecha-
nism is prior-free. We call this mechanism the random price seer mechanism and show that it is
approximately optimal.
Theorem 4.3 (Prior-FreeMechanism). Consider a convex payment seing with ci = p
d
i , ∀i ∈ N ,
where d ≥ 2 and the value distribution is an MHR distribution. Let APX be the expected revenue of
the random price seer mechanism. e random price seer mechanism achieves revenue APX which
satises:
APX
OPT
≥ 1
8
(
n − 1
n
)1−1/d
1
e1/d
≥ 1
16e
. (20)
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Proof. Observe that the revenue of the mechanism is equal to the revenue of the random re-
serve price mechanism with n − 1 bidders. us by applying Lemma 4.2 we have:
APX ≥ 1
8
(n − 1)1−1/dκ1/d . (21)
By eorem 3.3, we also have OPT ≤ n1−1/d (eκ)1/d . Combining the two bounds, yields the theo-
rem.

For d ≥ 2, the approximation ratio given by Equation (20) is 1
8e1/d > .075 in the limit, as n tends
towards innity, and is 1
8
as d tends towards innity as well. We explore how well the prior-free
mechanism does empirically using randomly generated MHR distributions in Section 6.
Detail-free mechanisms. We now show that if the auctioneer has some knowledge of the distri-
bution of values, then mechanisms can generate more expected revenue. Specically, knowing
the median of the distribution is sucient for geing a much beer approximation ratio. We
conclude this section by providing such detail-free designs with beer approximation ratios. e
mechanisms that we propose optimizes over the quantile reserve qˆ so as to get beer approxima-
tion ratios.
Theorem 4.4 (Median Reserve). e approximation ratio of the mechanism with median reserve
price κ (i.e., qˆ = 12 ) when, ∀i ∈ N , ci = pdi , where d ≥ 2 with MHR distributions, is:
APX
OPT
≥ 1
2
(
2n
e(n + 1)
)1/d
. (22)
Proof. Lemma 4.1 tells us that when qˆ = 12 ,
APX ≥ n
(
κ
1 + (n − 1)/2
)1/d
1
2
=
n
2
(
2κ
n + 1
)1/d
, (23)
and by eorem 3.3, we have:
APX
OPT
≥ n
2
(
2κ
n + 1
)1/d
1
n(d−1)/d (eκ)1/d =
1
2
(
2n
e(n + 1)
)1/d
. (24)

Equation (22) tells us that for large number of bidders, the approximation ratio is 1
2
(
2
e
)1/d
. As
d ≥ 2, this is at least 0.42. Further, as d tends towards innity, the approximation ratio approaches
1
2
. us, using distribution knowledge improves performance by a factor of 4 over the prior-free
mechanism.
We now show that if we use a quantile reserve that is also dependent on the exponent in the
payment function (rather than always themedian), thenwe can further improve the approximation
ratio, as is given in the following theorem (whose proof and analysis is deferred to Appendix D).
Theorem 4.5 (Cost-Optimized Reserve). Assume that the value distributions satisfy the Mono-
tone Hazard Rate (MHR) condition, and that the payment function for each bidder i ∈ N is of the
form ci (p) = pd , for d ≥ 2. Allocating uniformly at random to all bidders whose quantile is be-
low the quantile reserve qˆ = max
{
1
2
, 1 − 1
d−1
}
and charging them the ex-post truthful payment of(
v(qˆ)
Z
)1/d
, where Z is the realized number of bidders with quantile below qˆ, achieves revenue at least(
n
n+1
)1/d 1
2
√
e
for d ∈ [2, 3) and at least ( n
n+1
)1/d 1
(4e (d−2))1/d for d ≥ 3 of the optimal revenue.
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Observe that for d → ∞, this bound converges to 1, since (d − 2)1/d → 1. us, as the payment
functions become more convex, the cost-optimized reserve mechanism converges to full optimal-
ity.
5 UNKNOWN PAYMENT FUNCTION AND ALL-PAY IMPLEMENTATION
So far we have assumed that the auction designer knows the form of the payment function of
the bidders; in particular, she knows the exponent d in the payment function. is might render
the auction design brile to mis-specications of this exponent from market knowledge. Hence,
we explore whether there exist an auction design which is ignorant to the form of the payment
function which achieves a constant factor approximation to the optimal revenue for each possible
realization of the exponent d . However, we will still assume that the bidders themselves know the
exponent d and that this exponent is the same for every bidder.
One immediate obstacle to this endeavor is that any aempt to design a truthful mechanism
that satises the laer desideratum is bound to fail. Any truthful mechanism will need to charge
each bidder a payment that will make the allocation truthful. From Myerson’s characterization
of payments, such a truthful payment will be dependent on the exponent d . Hence, we need to
resort to non-truthful auctions. e main idea in this section stems from the fact that, as was
shown in Lemma 2.5, it is always optimal from a revenue maximization point of view to charge a
deterministic payment to each bidder that is independent of the other bidders realized valuations.
Such a mechanism essentially corresponds to an all-pay auction, i.e. an auction which solicits bids
from the bidders, decides an allocation based on these bids, and then charges each bidder his bid
no maer what allocation he receives.
In this section we examine the performance of all-pay auctions with appropriately chosen al-
location rules. A rst aempt would be to run an all-pay implementation of the median reserve
price auction: i.e. solicit bids, allocate uniformly at random to any bidder whose bid is above some
carefully chosen reserve (so that at equilibrium it corresponds to a median reserve in the value
space), and then charge each bidder his bid no maer what allocation he receives. e main prob-
lem with such an aempt is that the appropriate reserve price to charge so that it translates to a
median reserve in the value space is itself dependent on the exponent d . erefore, a universal
reserve price does not exist. Additionally, such types of non-truthful auctions where the allocation
depends on the absolute value of the bid of a bidder tend to not have unique equilibria.
Given the issues described, we look into allocation functions where the allocation of each bidder
only depends on the relative rank of his bid among the bids of his opponents. e key idea is that
we will try to approximate the median mechanism with such a relative ranking mechanism by
allocating uniformly to the top half of the bidders and nothing to the boom half. Assuming that
bidders bid according to a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium with a strictly monotone bid func-
tion (which will be the unique equilibrium based on the results of [Chawla and Hartline, 2013]),
then at equilibrium the bidders whose valuation is among the top 50% of valuations will be allo-
cated uniformly at random an allocation of 2/n5. If the number of bidders is at least some constant,
then this interim allocation function will strongly resemble the interim allocation function of the
median mechanism: bidders with value strictly above the median by some margin ϵ will get an
allocation of 2/n with probability approaching 1, while bidders whose value is strictly below the
median by some margin ϵ will get an allocation that is almost 0. e laer will follow from a Cher-
no bound argument. Hence, we can show that this mechanism will achieve an approximation
ratio APX/OPT that is of the form 1
α
−O
(√
log(n)
n
)
, where α is some small constant. In order to
5For simplicity in this section, we assume that n is an even number
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avoid dependence of our analysis on a lower bound on the density of the distribution of values, we
actually propose a more competitive all-pay auction where we only allocate to a smaller fraction
of the bidders. In the theorem that follows we pick the top quarter, and we note that the constants
could be further optimized by picking a more involved fraction. e proof of this theorem is given
in Appendix E.6
Theorem 5.1. Consider an all-pay auction which allocates uniformly to the top quarter of the
bidders, i.e.:
(1) Solicit a bid bi from each bidder;
(2) Allocate to bidder i xi (bi , b−i ) = 4n if bi is among the top n4 highest bids;
(3) Charge each bidder bi no maer whether they received allocation or not.
Assuming that ci (·) is a strictly monotone function that is the same for all bidders, and that the
distribution of values is atomless and has a continuous CDF with support [0, v¯], then at the unique
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this auction, each bidder will submit a bid bi (vi ) such that
bi (vi ) = c−1i
(
vi xˆ i (vi ) −
∫ vi
0
xˆ i (zi ) dzi
)
, (25)
where xˆ i is the interim allocation that corresponds to awarding an allocation of
4
n to the top
n
n valu-
ation bidders, i.e.
xˆ i (vi ) =
4
n
Pr
(
vi is among
n
4
highest values | vi
)
=
4
n
Pr
(∑
j,i
1vj ≥vi ≤
n
4
− 1 | vi
)
. (26)
Finally, assume that ci (p) = pd for some d ≥ 2, n ≥ 32 log(16v¯/κ), and that the distribution of
values is MHR. en this auction achieves revenue APX at the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium, which
guarantees:
APX
OPT
≥ 1
16
. (27)
6 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide empirical evidence that our proposed mechanisms (i.e., the prior-free
mechanism and the mechanisms with reserve prices) yield near-optimal performance. We rst
show that in a symmetric seing, it is possible to compute the optimal allocation and revenue
in polynomial time through the use of interim feasibility described by [Border, 1991]. en, we
describe the experimental setup and the results of the experiments.
6.1 Solving for the Optimal Auction
We describe the mathematical programs used to solve for the optimal auction. e implementa-
tions make use of Border’s theorem to reduce the number of allocation variables to a manageable
size; we refer the reader to [Hartline, 2015] for a concise description of interim feasibility con-
straints. We present our results for continuous distributions here, and state our result for discrete
distributions, noting that the proof for the discrete distribution seing is similar to that of the
continuous distribution. Interested readers may nd the discrete result in the appendix.
6 We also note that the constants in the analysis of this theorem could be optimized to obtain a beer result. For simplicity
of exposition we omit such optimization, as the main point of the theorem is that a constant approximation can be achieved
by a mechanism that is independent of the payment function.
Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, and Vasilis Syrgkanis 14
Lemma 6.1. In a symmetric seing with convex payments, where values are drawn from a contin-
uous regular distribution F with support inT = [0, 1] and density function f , the optimal auction can
be described by the following mathematical program:
max
z(·)
∫ 1
0
f (t)c−1
(∫ t
0
τz(τ ) dτ
)
dt (28)
subject to
∫ 1
0
z(τ ) (1 − F (max{t , τ })) dτ ≤ 1 − F (t)
n
n
, ∀t ∈ T (29)
z(τ ) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T (30)
Proof. In a symmetric environment, variables for bidder i will be equivalent to variables for
bidder j , so we can simplify a complete description of an optimal auction by focusing on one
representative bidder. e objective function for optimal auctions is
∫ 1
0
f (t)c−1 (cˆ(t)) dt , which
maximizes over interim allocation xˆ . Byeorem2.3, using a slightly dierent formof the payment
formula. For t ∈ [0, 1], we can describe payments as cˆ (t) =
∫ t
0
τ
dxˆ i (τ )
dτ dτ ; that is, z in the program
is the derivative of the allocation function, and we maximize over z. Once a solution for z is
found, interim allocations can be recovered by integrating z: xˆ (t) =
∫ t
0
z(τ ) dτ . e total expected
revenue can be found by solving the program, and then multiplying the objective value by the
total number of bidders, n.
We now turn to the interim feasibility constraints. As described by [Hartline, 2015] (Section
8.4.1), for symmetric environments, the only binding interim feasibility constraints say simply:
for any interval of values [t , 1], the expected value of the interim allocation function, given that
v exceeds t , must be upper bounded by the expected value of the indicator function that v is the
maximum draw, again given that v exceeds t : i.e. E[xˆ(v) | v ≥ t] ≤ E[1{v is the max value} | v ≥
t].
Taking expectations, for values ranging from t to 1, yields the following inequality:∫ 1
t
f (q)
∫ q
0
z(τ ) dτ dq ≤
∫ 1
t
f (τ )F (τ )n−1 dτ , ∀t ∈ T . (31)
Evaluating the right-hand side of the inequality,∫ 1
t
f (τ )F (τ )n−1 dτ = F (τ )
n
n
1
t
=
1 − F (t)n
n
. (32)
We then proceed by changing the order of integration on the le-hand side of the inequality:∫ 1
t
f (q)
∫ q
0
z(τ ) dτ dq =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
max{t,τ }
f (q)z(τ ) dq dτ (33)
=
∫ 1
0
z(τ ) F (q)|1max{t,τ } dτ (34)
=
∫ 1
0
z(τ ) (1 − F (max{t , τ })) dτ . (35)

Our experiments used discrete, rather than continuous, distributions. Here is Lemma 6.1 for the
discrete seing.
Lemma 6.2. In a symmetric seing with convex payments, where values are drawn from a discrete
regular distribution F with support in T = {1, . . . ,m} and probability mass function f , the optimal
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auction can be described the following mathematical program:
max
z
m∑
t=1
f (t)c−1
(
t∑
τ=1
τzτ
)
(36)
subject to
m∑
τ=t
z(τ ) (1 − F (max{t , τ } − 1)) ≤
m∑
q=t
f (q)y(q) (37)
zτ ≥ 0, ∀τ ∈ T , (38)
where y(t) = ∑n−1k=0 (n−1k ) 1k+1 (∑t−1τ=1 f (τ ))n−1−k f (t)k , and we let F (0) ≡ 0.
6.2 Experiments and Results
We now investigate how well our proposed mechanisms described perform empirically, and com-
pare the experimental results with what is theoretically guaranteed. Along with the mechanisms
described (Prior Free, Posted Price (Median), Posted Price (Monopoly), and the optimal BIC/IIR
program), we also implemented six other mechanisms, which we do not provide approximation
guarantees for: a mechanism in which only one bidder is allocated (i.e., xi (vi , v−i ) ∈ {0, 1}), a
mechanism in which only one bidder is allocated if she meets the monopoly reserve, a mechanism
in which all bidders of the highest value are allocated, a mechanism in which all bidders of the
highest value are allocated if they meet the monopoly reserve, a mechanism which allocates pro-
portionally by values, and a mechanism which allocates proportionally by non-negative virtual
values.
To compare all these mechanisms, we generated 50 random MHR distributions with support
T = {1, . . . , 50}. For each distribution, we simulated 10,000 auctions, and then computed the
average revenue of each, for each of n = {1, . . . , 30} symmetric bidders. Each bidder had payment
function ci (pi ) = p2i . We computed the mean revenue across distributions, and report how well
they do against the optimal BIC solution. We summarize the results of these experiments in Table 1
and Figure 1.
Although we provide no guarantees on performance for mechanisms that allocate proportion-
ally by virtual values, we nd that this mechanism does the best among all the mechanisms we
have proposed, averaging 93% of the optimal BIC revenue forn = 30. e posted price mechanisms
give similar performance, at 87% and 88% of OPT for the posted median price and posted monop-
oly price, respectively. e mechanism that allocates proportionally by values obtains 84% of OPT.
Finally, the prior-free mechanism performs surprisingly well, obtaining 70% of OPT; additional
distributional knowledge may only increase total expected revenue by 30% of OPT.
While the mechanism that allocates only to the highest bidder also does not rely on a prior, the
results highlight how important it is to have non-zero allocations in the convex payment seing.
In the usual quasi-linear utility seing, so long as the bidder with the highest virtual value is
allocated, a mechanism maximizes total expected revenue. In the convex payment seing, we see
that this is no longer true. e experimental results suggest that it is more desirable to allocate
something to all bidders with the highest (virtual) values, and perhaps even something to those that
do not have the highest (virtual) values. Also notice that when allocating to either only the highest
value, or to all bidders with the highest value, there is no benet to allocating only to bidders that
meet the monopoly reserve. As the number of bidders grows, the probability that a bidder with a
value larger than the monopoly reserve increases, so seing a reserve at the monopoly price only
helps when few bidders are present. us, we see convergence in expected revenue in seings
where we only allocate to the highest bidder, or to all highest bidders, regardless of the existence
of monopoly reserve prices.
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Method Mean Revenue Ratio to Opt Guarantee
BIC Opt 25.2096 1
Prior Free* 17.6538 0.69715 .07
Posted, Median Reserve 22.1199 0.87441 .42
Posted, Monopoly Reserve 22.3504 0.88319
To Highest, No Reserve* 6.9006 0.27757
To Highest, Monopoly Reserve 6.9006 0.27757
To All Highest, No Reserve* 11.2666 0.44057
To All Highest, Monopoly Reserve 11.2666 0.44057
Prop Val* 21.3163 0.84822
Prop VirVal 23.5587 0.93289
Table 1. Performance of the mechanisms tested for n = 30. A * indicates that the mechanism does not rely
on distributional knowledge.
For n = 30, by Equation (20), the prior-free mechanism has guarantee
APX
OPT
≥ 1
8
(
29
30
)1/2 (
1
e1/2
)
≈ .07; (39)
the posted-price (median) mechanism, by Equation (22), has guarantee
APX
OPT
≥ 1
2
(
60
31e
)1/2
≈ .42; (40)
In all cases, the experimental results suggest that we may do much beer than our worst-case
guarantees in practice.
7 CONCLUSION
We investigated single-parameter mechanisms where bidder’s utility functions are not linear with
respect to payments, but rather convex. Using Myerson’s analysis on payments, we showed how
well several mechanisms that rely on bidder distribution knowledge can do, and provide perfor-
mance guarantees with respect to the optimal BIC mechanism. We additionally showed how well
a prior-free mechanism can do in this seing. e mechanisms described were empirically evalu-
ated using valuations drawn from random MHR distributions, and we saw that the total expected
revenue generated by these mechanisms can, on average, exceed the guarantees we provide. We
additionally proposed and evaluated two mechanisms that we provide no guarantees for, which
allocate proportionally to values and virtual values, and see that they do well empirically as well,
with performance exceeding that of the mechanisms which we can provide performance guaran-
tees for. e theoretical results we provided describe mechanisms in which allocations are non-
zero for bidders without the largest (virtual) values. We saw that empirically, such an allocation
scheme is crucial to achieving the optimal revenue, as a mechanism which only allocates to the
highest bidder decreases in performance as the number of bidders decreases. In the future, we
hope to construct lower bounds on the proportional allocation mechanisms.
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A LARGE INEFFICIENCY WITH HIGHEST VALUEWINS AUCTION
Consider the following distribution of values: the value is either 1 or 1 − ϵ . It is equal to 1 with
probability
log(n)√
n
and to 1 − ϵ with probability 1 − log(n)√
n
.
We rst present a rough sketch of the proof. As the number of players grows large, then with
very high probability we will have approximately
√
n players that have value 1 and n−√n players
who have value 1−ϵ . So the interim allocation of the highest bidder wins auction is approximately:
1/
√
(n) for a player with value 1 and 0 for a player with value 1−epsilon. Moreover, the payment of
a player with value 1 is at most
√
x(1) ≈ 1/N 1/4, while the payment of a player with value 1 − ϵ is
approximately 0. us the expected payment of a single bidder is approximately 1√
n
∗ 1
N 1/4 and the
total expected payment is N times that which is n1/4. On the other hand, if we allocate to everyone
uniformly at random (as long as they bid at least 1−ϵ), then we can charge everyone
√
1−ϵ
n , leading
to a total revenue of
√
n(1 − ϵ). As ϵ → 0, the ratio of the optimal mechanism and the mechanism
which allocates to the highest bidder (breaking ties uniformly at random) isO(n1/4).
We now showmore formally that these asymptotics hold. In particularwe show that the revenue
of the highest bidder wins auction is of O(n1/4). e proof then follows by the argument above.
Let Xi denote the {0, 1} indicator random variable of whether a player i has value 1 or not. en
the interim allocation of a player with value 1 is:
x(1) = E
[
1
1 +
∑
j,i X j
]
≤ E
[
1∑
j X j
]
(41)
Since
∑
j X j is the sum of n independent {0, 1} random variables which are 1 with probability
1/√n, we have that 1
n
∑
j X j is at least
log(n)√
n
− log(2/δ )√
n
with probability at least 1 − δ , by applying
the Cherno bound. us we have:
x(1) ≤ 1(log(n) − log(1/δ ))√n (1 − δ ) + 1 · δ ≤
1
(log(n) − log(1/δ ))√n + δ (42)
By seing δ = 1√
n
, the laer is upper bounded by:
x(1) ≤ 1(log(n) − log(1/δ ))√n + δ =
2
log(n)√n +
1√
n
≤ 3√
n
(43)
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Now we also argue about the expected allocation of players with value 1 − ϵ . Such a player is
allocated only when every other player has value 1 − ϵ and in that case he is allocated uniformly
at random, hence geing allocation 1/n. us his expected allocation is:
x(0) = 1
n
(
1 − log(n)√
n
)n−1
≤ 1
n
1
n
(
1 − 1√
n − 1
)n−1
≤ 1
n
(
1
e
)√n−1
≤ 1
n2
(44)
since e
√
x−1 > x for any x > 1.
So the total expected payment collected by a single player is at most:
log(n)√
n
√
x(1) +
√
x(1 − ϵ) ≤ 2 log(n)√
nn1/4
+
1
n
≤ 3 log(n)
n3/4
(45)
Leading to a total expected payment of at most 3n1/4 log(n).
B THE SINGLE BIDDER SETTING
Here, we describe the performance of a mechanism where there is only one bidder, where the
reserve price is set to the median of the bidder’s distribution, κ.
Theorem B.1. e approximation ratio of the mechanism with median reserve price κ in a single
bidder environment where the bidder has a convex payment function ci , and valuations are drawn
from a regular distribution is 12 .
Proof. From Corollary 2.6, we can describe the expected revenue of the mechanism with re-
serve price κ as Evi∼Fi [pˆ(vi )] = Evi∼Fi
[
c−1i (h(vi ))
]
, where h∗(vi ) = ci (pˆi (vi )) is the revenue-
maximizing interim convex payment function for revenue-maximizing payment pˆ∗i (vi ), and c−1i
is the inverse of the convex payment function. By Jensen’s inequality, the optimal revenue is
upper-bounded by
OPT ≤ c−1i
(
E
vi∼Fi
[
h∗i (vi )
] )
. (46)
By Lemma 2.2:, R(q∗) ≤ κ. By denition of the monopoly reserve price, η (1 − F (η)) = R(q∗).
erefore, η (1 − F (η)) ≤ κ. Furthermore, by Myerson’s analysis of virtual values (eorem 2.4),
we know that maximizing total expected virtual surplus maximizes the total expected payments,
which is equivalent to maximizing the revenue curve:
OPT ≤ c−1i (R(q∗)) (47)
≤ c−1i (κ) . (48)
A mechanism that allocates to a bidder that bids at least κ and charges κ yields revenue:
APX = c−1i (κ)(1 − Fi (κ)) (49)
=
1
2
c−1i (κ). (50)
erefore, the approximation ratio of this mechanism is
APX
OPT
≥ 1
2
c−1i (κ)
1
c−1i (κ)
(51)
=
1
2
. (52)

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C PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
Proof. e function c−1i (vixi (vi , v−i )) is non-decreasing and concave. To maximize the sum∑
i ∈N c−1i (vixi (vi , v−i )), we can use the equi-marginal principle given by [Gossen, 1854], which
states that it is optimal to allocate greedily until supply is exhausted.
e derivative of the contribution of bidder i is
∂ (vixi (vi , v−i ))1/d
∂xi (vi , v−i )
=
1
d
v
1/d
i (xi (vi , v−i ))(1−d )/d . (53)
Equating derivatives for bidders i and j (as per the equi-marginal principle), we get
1
d
v
1/d
i (xi (vi , v−i ))(1−d )/d =
1
d
v
1/d
j
(
x j (vj , v−j )
) (1−d )/d
. (54)
e common terms can be removed, and aer raising the expressions to the d/(d − 1) power, we
can simplify to
v
1/(d−1)
i
xi (vi , v−i )
=
v
1/(d−1)
i
x j (vj , v−j )
. (55)
erefore, bidder i’s allocation in terms of bidder j is
xi (vi , v−i ) =
(
vi
vj
)1/(d−1)
x j (vj , v−j ). (56)
Plugging this expression into the ex-post feasibility condition yields:
n∑
i=1
xi (vi , v−i ) =
n∑
i=1
(
vi
vj
)1/(d−1)
x j (vj , v−j ). (57)
It is always optimal to allocate until
∑n
i=1 xi (vi , v−i ) = 1 when there is at least one bidder with a
positive constant, so the ex-post feasibility constraint can be wrien as
n∑
i=1
(
vi
vj
)1/(d−1)
x j (vj , v−j ) = 1. (58)
erefore, bidder j is allocated as follows:
x j (vj , v−j ) =
v
1/(d−1)
j∑n
i=1v
1/(d−1)
i
. (59)

D IMPROVED BOUND WITH COST SPECIFIC RESERVE
In this section we show that if we optimize the valuation reserve as a function of d , then we can
get a much beer guarantee which converges to 1 as d → ∞. Intuitively, as d → ∞ then we
should be allocating to almost every player and charging them a very high price. So we should be
using a reserve that allocates not with probability 1/2 but rather with probability q that is much
higher than 1/2. us we will use a reserve of v(q) for q ∈ [1/2, 1] and optimize q as a function of
d . Specically, we will use a q of max
{
1
2 , 1 − 1d−1
}
.
We will rst prove a Lemma which is an extension of the simplied prophet inequality that we
used in the previous section.
Lemma D.1. For any regular distribution and for any qˆ ≥ 1/2:
R(qˆ) ≥ (1 − qˆ)R(q∗) (60)
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Proof. First suppose that q∗ ≥ qˆ. en we know that R(q) is increasing until η and concave.
Hence:
R(qˆ) ≥ R(q
∗) − R(0)
q∗
qˆ + R(0) ≥ R(q∗)qˆ + R(0)(1 − qˆ) ≥ R(q∗)qˆ ≥ R(q∗)1
2
≥ R(q∗)(1 − qˆ) (61)
Now suppose that q∗ ≤ qˆ. en R(q) is decreasing in the region (q∗, 1] and R(1) = 0. us by
concavity of R(q), since qˆ ∈ (q∗, 1]:
R(qˆ) ≥ R(q
∗) − R(1)
q∗ − 1 (qˆ − 1) + R(1) =
R(q∗)
1 − q∗ (1 − qˆ) ≥ R(q
∗)(1 − qˆ) (62)

Theorem D.2. Assume that the value distributions satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) con-
dition and that the payment function is of the form c(p) = pd for d ≥ 2. en allocating uniformly at
random to all players whose quantile is below the quantile reserve qˆ = max{ 1
2
, 1− 1
d−1 } and charging
them the ex-post truthful payment of
(
v(qˆ)
Z
)1/d
, where Z is the realized number of players with quan-
tile below qˆ, achieves revenue at least
(
n
n+1
)1/d · 1
2
√
e
for d ∈ [2, 3) and at least ( n
n+1
)1/d · 1(4e (d−2))1/d
for d ≥ 3 of the optimal revenue.
Proof. For d ≤ 3, the reserve that we use is the median and hence the bound from eorem
4.4 applies.
So we prove the bound for the case of d ≥ 3 and qˆ = 1 − 1
d−1 . By Lemma 3.2, Lemma 2.1 and
Lemma D.1 we have that:
OPT ≤ n d−1d µ1/d ≤ n d−1d (eR(q∗))1/d ≤ n d−1d
(
e · R(qˆ)
1 − qˆ
)1/d
= n
d−1
d
(
e · qˆ · v(qˆ)
1 − qˆ
)1/d
(63)
On the other hand by Lemma 4.1, the revenue of the simple quantile reserve mechanism, with
quantile qˆ = 1 − 1
d−1 ≥ 12 is at least:
APX ≥ n · qˆ ·v(qˆ)
1/d
(1 + (n − 1) · qˆ)1/d
=
n · qˆ · v(qˆ)1/d
(1 − qˆ + n · qˆ)1/d
≥ n · qˆ · v(qˆ)
1/d
(qˆ + n · qˆ)1/d
=
n
(n + 1)1/d
qˆ · v(qˆ)1/d
qˆ1/d
(64)
us the ratio of the two mechanisms is at least:
APX
OPT
=
( n
n + 1
)1/d 1
e1/d
qˆ1−2/d (1 − qˆ)1/d =
( n
n + 1
)1/d 1
e1/d
(
(1 − qˆ)d−1 1 − qˆ
qˆ
)1/d
=
( n
n + 1
)1/d 1
e1/d
((
1 − 1
d − 1
)d−1
1
d − 2
)1/d
≥
( n
n + 1
)1/d 1
e1/d
(
1
4
1
d − 2
)1/d

E PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
e fact that the given bidding function is an equilibrium follows from the fact that it is a monotone
function of the valuation of each player. erefore, it gives rise to the interim allocation described
in the theorem. Moreover, the pair of the bid function and interim allocation satisfy Myerson’s
payment identity. Finally, no player wants to bid outside of the support of the bid distribution.
Hence, from standard analysis that can be found in [Hartline, 2015], this implies that the proposed
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pair of a bid function and an interim allocation constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Uniqueness
of this equilibrium follow from the results of [Chawla and Hartline, 2013].
We now move on to analyzing the revenue of this equilibrium of the all-pay auction. For sim-
plicity we will assume that the number of bidders is a multiple of 4. e result easily extends to
the general case, albeit with more complex notation.
We rst prove upper and lower bounds on the interim allocation of bidders as a function of
their quantile qi = 1 − F (vi ). For any quantile q, denote with X j (q) = 1{q j ≤ q}. Observe that:
E[X j (q)] = Pr[qj ≤ q] = q, since quantiles are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. Moreover, if we
denote with xˆ i (qi ) the interim allocation of player i when he has quantile qi , then:
xˆ i (qi ) =
4
n
Pr
[∑
j,i
X j (qi ) ≤
n
4
− 1
]
(65)
Let Sn−1(qi ) =
∑
j,i X j (qi ). Since Sn−1 is the sum of n − 1 independent 0/1 random variables,
each with success probability q, we get by the Cherno bound that, for any ϵ > 0:
Pr[(qi − ϵ)(n − 1) ≤ Sn−1(qi ) ≤ (qi + ϵ)(n − 1)] ≥ 1 − 2 exp{−2ϵ2n} (66)
us we have that for qi , such that: (qi + ϵ)(n − 1) ≤ n4 − 1:
xˆ i (qi ) =
4
n
Pr[Sn−1(qi ) ≤ n
4
− 1] = 4
n
(
1 − Pr[Sn−1(qi ) > n
4
− 1]
)
≥ 4
n
(1 − Pr[Sn−1(qi ) > (qi + ϵ)(n − 1)]) ≥ 4
n
(
1 − 2 exp{−2ϵ2n})
Re-arranging the condition on qi , we get that the laer bound on the interim allocation holds for
qi ≤ 14 − 34 1n−1 − ϵ .
Similarly, we have that for qi , such that: (qi − ϵ)(n − 1) > n4 − 1:
xˆ i (qi ) =
4
n
Pr[Sn−1(qi ) ≤ n
4
− 1]
≤ 4
n
Pr[Sn−1(qi ) ≤ (qi − ϵ)(n − 1)] ≤ 8
n
exp{−2ϵ2n}
Re-arranging the condition on qi , we get that the laer bound on the interim allocation holds for
qi >
1
4
− 3
4
1
n−1 + ϵ .
Finally, we know that the interim allocation xˆ i (qi ) is monotone decreasing in qi .
Now we consider the perceived payment of a player as a function of his quantile, which by
transforming Myerson’s identity to quantile space, takes the following form:
ci (bi (qi )) = vi (qi )xˆ i (qi ) +
∫ 1
qi
xˆ i (z)v ′i (z)dz = vi (qi )xˆi (qi ) −
∫ 1
qi
xˆ i (z)|v ′i (z)|dz
We will lower bound the perceived payment of a player with quantile qi ≤ 14 − 34 1n−1 − ϵ :
ci (bi (qi )) = vi (qi )xˆi (qi ) +
∫
qi
xˆ i (z)v ′i (z)dz
≥ vi (qi )xˆi (qi ) −
∫ 1
4− 34 1n−1+ϵ
qi
xˆ i (z)|v ′i (z)|dz −
∫ 1
1
4− 34 1n−1+ϵ
xˆ i (z)|v ′i (z)|dz
≥ vi (qi )xˆi (qi ) − xˆ i (qi )
∫ 1
4− 34 1n−1+ϵ
qi
|v ′i (z)|dz −
8
n
exp{−2ϵ2n}
∫ 1
1
4− 34 1n−1+ϵ
|v ′i (z)|dz
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≥ vi
(
1
4
− 3
4
1
n − 1 + ϵ
)
xˆ i (qi ) −
8
n
exp{−2ϵ2n}
∫ 1
1
4− 34 1n−1+ϵ
|v ′i (z)|dz
≥ vi
(
1
4
− 3
4
1
n − 1 + ϵ
)
4
n
(1 − 2 exp{−2ϵ2n}) − 8
n
exp{−2ϵ2n}v¯
≥ 4
n
vi
(
1
4
+ ϵ
)
− 16
n
exp{−2ϵ2n}v¯
Since a player has quantile smaller than 1
4
− 3
4
1
n−1 − ϵ with probability equal to 14 − 34 1n−1 − ϵ),
we can lower bound the ex-ante expected payment of each bidder by:
E[bi (qi )] ≥
(
1
4
− 3
4
1
n − 1 − ϵ
)
· c−1i
(
4
n
vi
(
1
4
+ ϵ
)
− 16
n
exp{−2ϵ2n})v¯
)
By picking ϵ =
√
log(16v¯/κ)
2n
(where κ = v(1/2) is the median), then we get:
E[bi (qi )] ≥
(
1
4
− 3
4
1
n − 1 −
√
log(16v¯/κ)
2n
)
· c−1i
(
4
n
vi
(
1
4
+
√
log(v¯/κ)
2n
)
− 1
n
κ
)
Assuming that
√
log(16v¯/κ)
2n ≤ 18 , which happens when n ≥ 32 log(16v¯/κ), then we have that:
vi
(
1
4
+
√
log(v¯/κ)
2n
)
≥ vi (1/2) = κ (67)
which yields the lower bound:
E[bi (qi )] ≥
(
1
8
− 3
4
1
n − 1
)
· c−1i
(
3
n
κ
)
Further assuming that 34
1
n−1 ≤ 116 ⇔ n ≥ 13 (which holds whenever n ≥ 32 log(16v¯/κ)), we get
that:
E[bi (qi )] ≥ 1
16
· c−1i
(
3
n
κ
)
Combining all of the above we get that for n ≥ 32 log(16v¯/κ), we can lower bound the revenue
of the all-pay auction by:
APX = n · 1
16
· c−1i
(
3
n
κ
)
(68)
If ci (x) = xd , then:
APX ≥ n · 1
16
·
(
3
n
κ
)1/d
(69)
On the other hand by Lemma 3.2, we have that for MHR distributions:
OPT ≤ n
(eκ
n
)1/d
(70)
Hence, we conclude the nal part of the theorem that:
APX
OPT
≥ 1
16
(
3
e
)1/d
≥ 1
16
(71)
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F PROOF OF LEMMA 6.2
Proof. e proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.1. In a symmetric environment, variables for
bidder i will be equivalent to variables for bidder j , so we can simplify a complete description of
an optimal auction by focusing on one representative bidder. e objective function makes use of
eorem 2.3, using a slightly dierent form of the payment formula. For τ ∈ T , we can describe
payments as cˆ(τ ) = ∑τt=1 t(xˆ (t)− xˆ (t −1)) = ∑τt=1 tz(t); that is, z(t) = xˆ (t)− xˆ (t −1) in the program
is the dierence between successive allocations, where we let xˆ (0) ≡ 0. Once a solution for z is
found, interim allocations can be recovered by summing z: xˆ (τ ) = ∑τt=1 z(t). e total expected
revenue can be found by solving for the program, and then multiplying the program value by the
total number of bidders, n.
We now turn to the interim feasibility constraints. As described by [Hartline, 2015] (Section
8.4.1), for symmetric environments, the only binding interim feasibility conditions simply say that
for any interval of values [t ,∞) the integral of the allocation to players in that interval, must be
upper bounded by the integral of the allocation to such players by the highest value wins allocation
(with random tie-breaking). Under the highest value wins auction (with random tie-breaking), the
expected allocation of a player with value t is:
y(t) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n − 1
k
)
1
k + 1
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f (τ )
)n−1−k
f (t)k , (72)
so we have the following inequality:
m∑
q=t
f (t)
q∑
τ=1
z(τ ) ≤
m∑
q=t
f (q)y(q), ∀t ∈ T . (73)
We then proceed by changing the order of summation on the le-hand side of the inequality:
m∑
q=t
f (q)
q∑
τ=1
z(q) =
m∑
τ=t
z(τ )
m∑
q=max{t,τ }
f (q) (74)
=
m∑
τ=t
z(τ )
(
1 −
max{t,τ }−1∑
k=1
f (k)
)
(75)
=
m∑
τ=t
z(τ ) (1 − F (max{t , τ } − 1)) . (76)

